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I. INTRODUCTION
Currently, international courts are not able to exercise jurisdic-
tion over a claim brought by a third-party nation state on behalf of
Hurricane Katrina victims against the United States for the suffering
caused by its inadequate policies. However, another country should be
permitted to bring such claims in international courts. Where do the
citizens of any country go when their own nation has failed to answer a
* Florida Agriculture & Mechanical University College of Law, J.D. May 2009, Em-
bry-Riddle Aeronautical University, M.B.A. Aviation, Honors, Pace University, Bachelors
Business Administration. Special thanks to Professor Lundy Langston.
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call for help regarding a disaster-natural or man-made-that has
caused its citizens to suffer indignity and humiliation? In 2005, Hurri-
cane Katrina, one of the deadliest and costliest natural disasters in the
history of the United States, struck the Gulf Coast.' The most severe
loss of life due to Hurricane Katrina occurred in New Orleans, Louisi-
ana as a result of the catastrophic failure of the levees and the federal
flood protection system of the U.S.2
The federal government created the Federal Emergency Man-
agement Agency (FEMA) to be the leader in preparedness for all
disasters, natural or man-made.3 FEMA's mission is to "reduce the
loss of life and property and protect the Nation from all hazards, in-
cluding natural disasters, acts of terrorism, and other man-made
disasters, by leading and supporting the Nation in risk-based, compre-
hensive emergency management system of preparedness, protection,
response, recovery, and mitigation."4 FEMA fell short of meeting its
obligations when its management was overwhelmed, causing the loss
of life of over 1,300 people and the suffering, indignity, and humiliation
of more than one million others.5 FEMA was supposed to provide state
and local government with experts in specialized fields and funding for
rebuilding efforts and relief funds for infrastructure.6
The citizens of New Orleans, who were most affected by Hurri-
cane Katrina, have suffered indignity and humiliation as a result of
the failures of FEMA. Nearly four years later, the signs of Katrina
linger as a result of the failures of FEMA to live up to its mission. New
Orleans still struggles to recover. Many of the citizens remain dis-
placed and have lost their homes. Where are these citizens to go for
relief? What court, if any, has jurisdiction to address the atrocities suf-
fered by the victims of Hurricane Katrina? Consider the possibility
1. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, http://www.katrina.noaa.gov
(last visited Nov. 9, 2008) (insured losses of approximately $60 billion were far higher than
those from Hurricane Andrew in 1992, which totaled $21 billion).
2. The Flood Control Act of 1965 gave the U.S. Corps of Engineers control to design
and construct flood control protections for New Orleans.
3. Federal Emergency Management Agency, FEMA Strategic Plan Fiscal Years
2008-2013 (January 2008), available at http://www.fema.gov/pdflabout/fy08_fema-sp
bookmarked.pdf (last visited Nov. 26, 2008) [hereinafter "FEMA Strategic Plan"].
4. Id.
5. FRANCES FRAGos TOWNSEND, ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR HOMELAND
SECURITY AND COUNTERTERRORISM, THE FEDERAL RESPONSE To HURRICANE KATRINA:
LESSONS LEARNED 1 (2006) [hereinafter LESSONS LEARNED], available at http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/reports/katrina-lessons-learned.pdf (last visited Oct. 25, 2009)
(Hurricane Katrina first made land fall in Florida then progressed along the Gulf Coast of
Mississippi, Louisiana, and Alabama, flooding the historic city of New Orleans, killing over
1,300 people, and wreaking staggering physical destruction in its path).
6. See generally FEMA Strategic Plan, supra note 3.
156
HURRICANE KATRINA VICTIMS
that as a result of the failures of federal government in responding to
the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, another nation State might bring
a claim on behalf of the citizens of the U.S. in the international commu-
nity. The prevailing question should be whether the international
courts may exercise jurisdiction over such a claim.
This note will argue that a pattern of failed policies may be a
crime against humanity. In addition, discussion will include the juris-
diction of international courts' over crimes against humanity as
accepted under international law. Finally, recommendations are made
on how to handle jurisdictional problems in the international
community.
II. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S PATTERN OF FAILED DISASTER
PREPAREDNESS POLICIES IS A CRIME, AGAINST HUMANITY
Generally, a single incident does not constitute a crime against
humanity;7 however, a systematic or widespread attack may establish
a crime against humanity where there is a pattern of failures.8 The
U.S. has demonstrated a pattern of inadequate responses to natural
disasters that impact its citizens. An insufficient response to a natural
disaster based on the federal government policies could be considered
systematic or widespread so as to constitute a crime against humanity
when there is a pattern of failures. The United States' failure to pre-
pare for Hurricane Katrina caused the citizens of New Orleans to
suffer indignity, humiliation, and a significant loss of life. Thus, an
international court would be justified in asserting universal jurisdic-
tion over a claim brought by another nation state on behalf of the
harmed citizens.
A. The Pattern of Inadequate Responses to Natural Disasters
In August 1992, Hurricane Andrew,9 with sustained winds
of 165 miles per hour, struck the Florida and Louisiana Gulf
7. Doe v. Rafael Saravia, 348 F. Supp. 2d 1112, 1154-1157 (E.D. Cal. 2004).
8. Id.
9. ED RAPPAPORT, NATIONAL HURRICANE CENTER, PRELIMINARY REPORT HURRICANE
ANDREW (1992), available at http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/1992andrew.html#FOOT1 (last
visited Nov. 16, 2008). Andrew was a small and ferocious Cape Verde hurricane that
wrought unprecedented economic devastation along a path through the northwestern
Bahamas, the southern Florida peninsula, and south-central Louisiana. Damage in the
United States is estimated to be near $25 billion, making Andrew the most expensive
natural disaster in U.S. history. The tropical cyclone struck southern Dade County, Florida,
especially hard with violent winds and storm surges characteristic of a category 4 hurricane
(see addendum on upgrade to category 5) on the Saffir/Simpson Hurricane Scale, and with a
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coasts.' 0 The result was billions of dollars in property damage and tre-
mendous loss of life." The criticisms of the federal government for
FEMA's response to Andrew were summed up by the famous exclama-
tion made by Kate Hale, "[w]here in the hell is the cavalry on this
one?"12 Kate Hale was the emergency management director for Dade
County, Florida.13 The federal government at large was accused of not
responding fast enough to house, feed, and sustain the approximately
250,000 people left homeless in the affected areas.' 4 It took nearly five
days for the federal government to dispatch active duty troops to South
Dade County to set up temporary housing.15 FE1VA had previously
been criticized for its response to Hurricane Hugo, which hit South
Carolina in September 1989, and many of the same issues that plagued
the agency during Hurricane Andrew were also evident during the re-
sponse to Hurricane Katrina in 2005.16
It does not appear as though the federal government has
learned the lessons of past natural disasters. There continues to be
inadequate responses to natural disasters that cause loss of life and
suffering by the citizens of indignity and humiliation. The policies of
the federal government resulted in systematic and widespread chaos
for the people of New Orleans. Thus, it is argued herein that the ac-
tion, or inaction, of the federal government is a crime against
humanity subject to universal jurisdiction in the international courts.
central pressure (922 mb) that is the third lowest this century for a hurricane at landfall in
the United States. In Dade County alone, the forces of Andrew resulted in 15 deaths and up
to one-quarter million people left temporarily homeless. An additional 25 lives were lost in
Dade County from the indirect effects of Andrew. Id.
10. Douglas Himberger, David Sulek, & Stephen Krill, Jr., When There is No Calvary,
48 Strategy + Business (2007), available at http://www.strategy-business.com/press/article/
07309?gko=8blfa-1876-26316031 (last visited Nov. 16, 2008).
11. Id.
12. Id. (three days had passed since Hurricane Andrew had made landfall and the
people in Dade County were still waiting on supplies while community leaders were
pleading for federal assistance).
13. Id.
14. Id. at 2 (testifying before the U.S. House Committee on Homeland Security on
October 19, 2005, Governor Jeb Bush said "Florida learned a hard lesson about response
and recovery after Andrew.").
15. Rappaport, supra note 9.
16. Id.; see generally Himberger, supra note 10.
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III. THE RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA CONSTITUTES "INHUMANE
ACTS" AGAINST VICTIMS OF KATRINA AND A CRIME AGAINST
HUMANITY UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
Crimes against humanity have been defined in treaties and in-
ternational law. Article 6 of the Charter of the International Military
Tribunal defined crimes against humanity as "murder, extermination,
enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against
any civilian population, before and during the war, or persecutions on
political, racial, or religious grounds in execution of or in connection
with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not
in violation of domestic law of the country where perpetrated."l7 Simi-
larly, Article II of the Control Council Law No. 10 adopted the same
definition of crimes against humanity stated in the Nuremberg
Trials.' 8
Article VII of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court, defines crimes against humanity as:
1. For the purpose of this Statute, "crimes against humanity"
means any of the following acts when committed as part of a wide-
spread or systematic attack directed against any civilian




(d) Deportation or forcible transfer of population;
(e) Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical
liberty in violation of fundamental rules of international law;
(h) Persecution against any identifiable group or collec-
tively on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious,
gender as defined in paragraph 3, or other grounds that are univer-
sally recognized as impermissible under international law, in
connection with any act referred to in this paragraph or any crime
within the jurisdiction of the Court;
(k) Other inhumane acts of a similar character intention-
ally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental
or physical health
(a) "Attack directed against any civilian population" means
a course of conduct involving the multiple commission of acts re-
ferred to in paragraph 1 against any civilian population, pursuant
17. Charter of the International Military Tribunal art. 6, 82 U.N.T.S. 284, Aug. 8,
1945, available at http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/nuremberg/Nuremberg
Indictments.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2008).
18. Control Council Law No. 10, art. II, Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes,
Crimes Against Peace and Against Humanity, December 20, 1945, available at http://wwwl.
umn.edu/humanrts/instree/ccnol0.htm (last visited Oct. 24, 2010).
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to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit
such attack; 19
Crimes against humanity committed during a time of war or
peace do not have a statute of limitations. 20 Thus, the international
courts would always have the legal capacity to pursue an offender that
committed a crime against humanity.
Customary international laws are binding upon all nations,
even without a particular nation's consent; however, they can be modi-
fied within a state by subsequent legislation or a treaty, provided that
the customary international law is not a preemptory norm. 21 A pre-
emptory norm, or jus cogens, does not permit derogation, but prevails
over and invalidates any prior conflicting international agreements or
other rules of international law, and can be modified only by a subse-
quent norm of general international law having the same character. 22
International law controls only when there is no treaty and no control-
ling executive or legislative act or judicial decision.23 "International
law" is a part of the law of the U.S., and as such, is the law of all states
of the Union, but it is a part of the United States law for application of
its own principles. 24 The application of international laws as part of
U.S. law is solely concerned with international rights and duties and
not with domestic rights and duties. 25
In Sosa, the Supreme Court held that alien tort claims must
"rest on a norm of international character accepted by the civilized
world."26 The Court also identified three offenses that give rise to lia-
bility under the traditional law of nations: violation of safe conduct,
infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy.27 These of-
19. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Part II Art. VII, (1998)
[hereinafter Rome Statute].
20. United Nations Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to
War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, Nov. 11, 1970, 754 U.N.T.S. 73, available at
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/warcrimes.htm#wp 1037805.
21. In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation, 373 F.Supp. 2d 7 (E.D.N.Y., 2005);
see also Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166 (1994) (explaining that
preemptory norm, or jus cogens, is a principle of international law that is based on values
taken to be fundamental to the international community and that cannot be set aside (as by
treaty)).
22. Agent Orange, 373 F.Supp. 2d 7.
23. See Bradvica v. I.N.S., 128 F.3d 1009 (7th Cir. 1997) (asserting under international
law, such claims are considered frivolous because customary international laws are not
applicable in domestic courts where there is a controlling legislative act and a prior treaty
does not trump provisions of a subsequent legislative act).
24. Skiriotes v. State of Florida, 313 U.S. 69 (1941).
25. Id.
26. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 725 (2004).
27. Id. at 715.
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fenses were universally accepted and defined with specificity. 2 8 The
Court stated that "[aictionable violations of international law must be
of a norm that is specific, universal and obligatory."29 The prohibition
against crimes against humanity constitutes such a specific, universal
and obligatory norm.a0 The loss of life during Hurricane Katrina, and
the suffering the citizens of New Orleans endured would be actionable
violations of specific, universal and obligatory international law, due to
the federal government's lack of preparedness. The federal govern-
ment's response to Hurricane Katrina is not acceptable in civilized
society. There was a specific obligation on the part of the government
to ensure the safety of the citizens of New Orleans during this disaster.
The international prohibition of crimes against humanity is ex-
plicitly codified in several multilateral agreements and has been
extensively litigated in international tribunals, constituting a body of
doctrinal exposition.31 The prohibition of crimes against humanity has
been defined with an ever greater degree of specificity than the three
offenses identified by the Court in Sosa.32 The prohibition was first
recognized by the Charter of the International Military Tribunal at
Nuremberg ("Nuremberg Charter"). 33 The Nuremberg Charter was
adopted to ensure punishment for serious human rights abuses com-
mitted by the military and political leaders of Nazi Germany during
World War II.34 Under the Nuremberg Charter, acts constituting
crimes against humanity included "murder, extermination, enslave-
ment, deportation, persecution on political, racial or religious grounds,
or other inhumane acts committed against a civilian population."35
Criminal liability was acknowledged against Nazi leaders for crimes
against humanity under international law.3 6 Since the adoption of the
Nuremberg Charter, the prohibition of crimes against humanity has
been expressly recognized in several international instruments.3 7
28. Doe, 348 F. Supp. 2d 1112.
29. Sosa at 732 (quoting In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litigation, 25 F.3d
1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994)).
30. Doe, 348 F. Supp. 2d 1112.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 702, rpt. note 1 (1987).
34. See generally M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAw 1155 (2d ed.1999).
35. Charter of International Military Tribunal art. 6(c), 82 U.N.T.S. 284.
36. See The Nuremberg Trials, 6 F.R.D. 69 (1946).
37. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 1/95, U.N. Doe. A/RES/95/1 (Dec. 11, 1946) (affirming principles
set forth in Nuremberg Charter and decision of International Military Tribunal); United
Nations, supra note 20; Principles of International Co-Operation in the Detection, Arrest,
1612010
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With the recognition of liability for crimes against humanity, the fed-
eral government would be liable to the international community for
any crimes committed against humanity for its failed policies that re-
sulted in "other inhumane acts" against its citizens.
In 1993, the United Nations ("U.N.") Security Council estab-
lished the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
("ICTY") to prosecute serious violations of international law committed
in that territory, including genocide, war crimes, and crimes against
humanity.38 The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
("ICTR") was established by the Security Council in 1994 to prosecute
similar violations of international law committed in Rwanda.39 Both
the ICTY and ICTR have affirmed the status of crimes against human-
ity under international law. 4 0 At the very least, the U.N. Security
Council should create an International Criminal Tribunal to investi-
gate any violations of international law that may have been committed
in New Orleans during Hurricane Katrina.
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court provides
the most current definition of crimes against humanity under interna-
tional law.4 1 Article 7 of the Rome Statute defines a crime against
humanity as one of a number of defined acts when committed as part of
a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian popula-
tion with knowledge of the attack.42 Its recent codification in the Rome
Statute makes Article 7 an authoritative interpretation of crimes
against humanity in international law.4 3 The Rome Statute has been
ratified or acceded to by 94 countries and signed by an additional 47,
including four of the five members of the U.N. Security Council, signi-
fying widespread acceptance. 44 Since the Rome Statute is the
authoritative interpretation of crimes against humanity in interna-
Extradition and Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes and Crimes against
Humanity, G.A. Res. 3074 (XXVIII), U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 30, U.N. Doc. A/3020/Add.1
(Dec. 3, 1973).
38. See Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons
Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the
Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25,
1993).
39. See STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA, U.N. Doc. S/
RES/955 (1994), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1602 (1994).
40. Doe, 348 F. Supp. 2d 1112, 1154-57.
41. Rome Statute, Part II. Art. VII.
42. Id. at 1004.
43. See generally OTTo TRIFFTERER, COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (1999).




tional law, it follows that the definition of crimes against humanity is
now a preemptory norm that permits the international court to exer-
cise jurisdiction over member states to the U.N. under the Rome
Statute for violations of crimes against humanity.
The Rome statute requires four elements to establish a crime
against humanity: (1) an act committed in violation of a provision; "(2)
committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack; (3) directed
against a civilian population; and (4) committed with knowledge of the
attack."45 Significantly, even a single act by an individual, taken
within the context of a widespread or systematic attack against a civil-
ian population, can constitute a crime against humanity. 46
According to Antonio Cassesse, the former President of the In-
ternational Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia:
when one or more individuals are . .. accused . . . of perpetrating
specific atrocities or vicious acts, in order to determine whether the
necessary threshold is met one should use the following test: one
ought to look at these atrocities or acts in their context and verify
whether they may be regarded as part of an overall policy or a con-
sistent pattern of inhumanity, or whether they instead constitute
isolated or sporadic acts of cruelty or wickedness. 47
This principle was illustrated in Prosecutor v. Msksic where the court
stated in pertinent part:
Crimes against humanity ... must be widespread or demonstrate a
systematic character. However, as long as there is a link with the
widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population, a
single act could qualify as a crime against humanity. As such, an
individual committing a crime against a single victim or a limited
number of victims might be recognized as guilty of a crime against
humanity if his acts were part of the specific context identified
above.48
Under this analysis, the federal government's failure to prepare for a
storm-as a result of a system of inadequate policies or overall inhu-
45. Doe, 348 F. Supp. 2d 1112, 1154-1157.
46. Id. at 1156.
47. ANTONIO CASSESSE, THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A
COMMENTARY 353, 361 (2002); see generally, Darryl Robinson, Development in International
Criminal Law: Defining "Crimes against Humanity" at the Rome Conference, 93 Am. J. OF
INT'L LAw 43, 48 (2002).
48. Prosecutor v. Msksic, Case No. IT-95-13-R61, Review of Indictment Pursuant to
Rule 61, 30 (Apr. 3, 1996); see also Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Judgment,
649 (May 7, 1997) ("Clearly, a single act by a perpetrator taken within the context of a
widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population entails individual criminal
responsibility and an individual perpetrator need not commit numerous offenses to be held
liable."); Doe, 348 F. Supp. 2d 1112, 1154-1157.
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manity-despite having notice of the harm it could inflict,
demonstrates systematic or widespread attack on a civilian population.
Several federal courts in the U.S. have accepted the well-estab-
lished nature of crimes against humanity and that "[c]ustomary
international law rules proscribing crimes against humanity, including
genocide, and war crimes, have been enforceable against individuals
since World War II.49 "Crimes against humanity have been recognized
as a violation of customary international law since the Nuremberg Tri-
als in 1944."5o "It is well-settled that a party who commits a crime
against humanity violates international law."5 1 "[T]he ruling of the
Nuremberg Tribunal memorialized the recognition of 'crimes against
humanity' as customary international law."5 2 The U.S. and other na-
tions have recognized 'war crimes' and 'crimes against humanity,'
including 'genocide,' as crimes for which international law permits the
exercise of universal jurisdiction."5 3
Several U.S. courts have referenced the specific, universal, and
obligatory nature of crimes against humanity in their rulings.54 In
Mehinovic, the district court applied the "specific, universal and obliga-
tory" test and held that crimes against humanity are actionable.5 5 The
district court in Wiwa, also followed this approach, analyzing several
claims under the "specific, universal and obligatory" standard, holding
the prohibition of crimes against humanity to be "a norm that is cus-
tomary, obligatory, and well-defined in international jurisprudence."56
It has also been recognized that crimes against humanity constitute a
specific, universal, and obligatory norm, thus making them actionable
49. See, e.g., Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Corp., 343 F.3d 140, 151 (2d Cir. 2003).
50. Aldana v. Fresh Del Monte Produce, Inc., 305 F.Supp. 2d 1285, 1299 (S.D. Fla.
2003).
51. Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 221 F.Supp. 2d 1116, 150 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (concluding a
party may be held liable for violating international law under the Alien Tort Crime Act).
52. Estate of Cabello v. Fernandez-Larios, 157 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1360-61 (S.D. Fla.
2001); see also Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424, 440 (D.N.J. 1999)
(recognizing crimes against humanity as a violation of international law); see Quinn v.
Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 799 (9th Cir. 1986) ("crimes against humanity, such as genocide,
violate international law").
53. See also United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 105 (2d Cir.2003); Sosa, 542 U.S. at
762 (Breyer, J., concurring) (recognizing that international law views crimes against
humanity as universally condemned behavior that is subject to prosecution).
54. Doe, 348 F. Supp. 2d 1112, 1154-1157 (recognizing liability under Alien Tort
Criminal Act ("ATCA")).
55. Mehinovic, 198 F.Supp. 2d at 1344, 1352-54 (crimes were actionable under the
ATCA).
56. Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 96CIV8386 (KMW) 2002 WL 319887, at
*5, 9, 27 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2002) (claims brought under the ATCA).
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under international law.5 7 The assassination of Archbishop Romero
met the elements for establishing a crime against humanity.5 8 The Ro-
mero assassination occurred in an environment of state-sanctioned
violence that was both widespread throughout El Salvador and consti-
tuted systematic, inhumane attacks on the civilian population by the
ruling military.59 The death squad, which perpetrated the murder of
Archbishop Romero, acted as part of a calculated strategy by the mili-
tary to terrorize the civilian population into submission.60 The
decision to kill Romero was made to silence his criticism of the state
security forces and state implemented repression. 6 1 At or about the
same time, other priests were being murdered by the military and
death squads to deter their practice of liberation theology. 62 Saravia
knew that he was involved in an operation to murder the revered Arch-
bishop, one of the most important civilians in El Salvador.6 3 Given
that this particular act took place within the context of other wide-
spread and systematic attacks against the civilian population by state
security forces and state-sponsored death squads, the assassination of
Romero meets the four criteria for establishing it as a crime against
humanity.6 4 This extrajudicial killing meets the Supreme Court's re-
quirements identified in Sosa.65 It will be challenging to establish the
elements of a crime against humanity as a result of the policies of the
U.S. regarding preparedness for all natural disasters such as Hurri-
cane Katrina. However, this article suggests that some form of
liability for the inadequate response during Katrina is warranted, even
if it is found not to be criminal. Generally, relief for crimes against
humanity is punitive, although it may be time to establish some sort of
civil liability.
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IV. INTERNATIONAL COURTS ASSERTING UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION
OVER CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY
International law recognizes five general principles by which a
sovereign State may exercise jurisdiction.6 6 Though the universality
principle will primarily be discussed,6 7 the other principles are de-
scribed as follows. The territorial principle permits jurisdiction where
the alleged crime was committed within the state's territory, or "[a]cts
done outside a jurisdiction, but intended to produce and producing det-
rimental effects within it, justify a State in punishing the cause of the
harm as if he [the perpetrator] had been present at the effect, if the
State should succeed in getting him within its power."68 The Act does
not have to be committed within the territory, just intended to have an
effect within the territory asserting jurisdiction;6 9 nationality principle
grants the authority to exercise jurisdiction over nation citizens based
upon the allegiance they owe the country and its laws;70 protective
principle allows a state to exercise authority to the extent that is rea-
sonably necessary to protect itself and its citizens from harm;71 passive
personality principle is a state establishing jurisdiction based on the
victim being a national of the state.72
66. Chua Han Mow v. United States, 730 F.2d 1308 (9th Cir. 1984) (permitting
extraterritorial jurisdiction over a Malaysian citizen who violated importation and
distribution laws on controlled substances, arrested and incarcerated in Malaysia for drug
smuggling).
67. United States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086 (9th Cir. 1991) (stating universal jurisdiction
refers to the competence of any state which obtains custody of an offender to proscribe and
punish an offense with which it has no connection based on territory or nationality and that
criminal act does not affect the state).
68. Chua Han Mow, 730 F.2d 1308.
69. United States v. Ricardo, 619 F.2d 1124 (5th Cir. 1980) (finding jurisdiction
appropriate where a conspiracy that occurred outside the U.S. extraterritorial jurisdiction
was in furtherance of an intended effect within the U.S. territory).
70. United States v. Walczak, 783 F.2d 852 (9th Cir.1986) (finding a false statement on
a customs declaration form by a U.S. citizens was a basis for jurisdiction under the
nationality principle).
71. United States v. Gonzalez, 776 F.2d 931 (11th Cir.1985) (finding foreign nationals
defendants charged with possession and distributing marijuana in the custom waters were
within U.S. jurisdiction under the protective principle); see also THE RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 402 cmt. g (1986) ("The principle
has not been generally accepted for ordinary torts or crimes, but it is increasingly accepted
as applied to terrorist and other organized attacks on a state's nationals by reason of their
nationality, or to assassination of a state's diplomatic representatives or other officials.").
72. United States v. Roberts, 1 F.Supp. 2d 601 (1998) (holding the U.S. established
jurisdiction over the defendant, a sexual abuser, because the victim on the cruise ship that
was out to sea was a national of the U.S.).
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The primary focus here is the universal principle, which allows
a state to exercise jurisdiction over a criminal act even if there is no
connection between the offense in question and the state exercising ju-
risdiction.7 3 Countries generally established jurisdiction under
international law for criminal cases based on a connection between the
state and the crime. 74 Under the universal principle, states may pre-
scribe and prosecute "certain offenses recognized by the community of
nations as of universal concern, such as piracy, slave trade, attacks on
or hijacking of aircraft, genocide, war crimes, and perhaps certain acts
of terrorism," even in the absence of a special connection between the
state and the offense.7 5 Universal jurisdiction relies primarily on the
nature of the crime and not the place where the crime was committed,
the nationality of the accused, or that of the victim.76 Crimes that are
"universally condemned," which are particularly heinous and recog-
nized as such by almost all cultures, established the notion that a state
may prosecute a crime based on the universal jurisdiction principle.77
The international community as a whole has an interest in prosecuting
those heinous crimes because the offenders are considered "enemies of
all people."7 8 A state asserting authority under universal jurisdiction
is thereby enforcing customary international law on behalf of the inter-
national community.79 The duty and obligation upon a state to use
universal jurisdiction is to prevent offenders from escaping responsibil-
73. Gabriel Bottini, Universal Jurisdiction After the Creation of the International
Criminal Court, 36 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 503, 510 (2004).
74. Amanda L. Morgan, U.S. Officials Vulnerability to "Global Justice": Will Universal
Jurisdiction Over War Crimes Make traveling for Pleasure Less Pleasurable?, 50 HASTINGS
L.J. 407, 428 (December 2005) (explaining universal jurisdiction and how a duty to act may
be created upon another country to act to bring violators to justice).
75. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086 (affirming convictions for hijacking of aircraft in Jordanian
passenger aircraft in Beirut, Lebanon even though hostage taking was not recognized as a
universal crime; it was recognized as a domestic crime in the U.S.); see generally
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE U.S.§§ 404, 423 (1987).
76. Princeton Project on Universal Jurisdiction, July 23, 2001, available at http://www.
globalpolicy.org/intljustice/universal/2001/princetonprinciples.htm (last visited Nov. 15,
2008) ("The principle of universal jurisdiction is based on the notion that certain crimes are
so harmful to international interests that states are entitled - and even obliged to bring
proceedings against the perpetrator, regardless of the location of the crime or the
nationality of the perpetrator or victim.").
77. Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571, 582 (6th Cir. 1985); Morgan supra note 74,
at 429.
78. Demjanjuk, 776 F.2d at 582; see Morgan, supra note 74, at 429.
79. Jordan J. Paust, U.S. Schizophrenia with Respect to Prosecution of Core
International Crimes, 103 J. INT'L L. & DIPL. 58, 61 (2004); see also Morgan, supra note 74,
at 430.
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ity by finding a safe haven in another country not connected to the
offense.80
Universal jurisdiction establishes a method for a state to en-
force sanctions for some crimes that are independently based in
international law. 8 ' Universal jurisdiction applies to crimes that "are
so universally condemned that the perpetrators are the enemies of all
people."8 2 For an international crime to be subject to universal juris-
diction there must be an express recognition of this jurisdiction
through international custom or convention.83 A state traditionally
has had authority to exercise universal jurisdiction for certain interna-
tional crimes: piracy, war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity,
and torture.84 The determination of what constitutes a crime against
humanity varies with each international convention.8 5 Under the
Rome Statute, the International Criminal Courts recognize apartheid,
forced disappearances of persons, and torture as crimes against hu-
manity and thereby subject to universal jurisdiction under certain
treaties.8 6 Universal jurisdiction has also been exercised for the crime
of torture under customary international law, outside the framework of
any convention.87
The principle that it is a state's duty to bring justice to individu-
als who commit war crimes when they are not prosecuted in their own
country arose out of the Nuremberg trials.88 The Israeli Supreme
Court also recognized the notion of universal jurisdiction when it rea-
soned that jurisdiction extends to acts that "damage vital international
interests; they impair the foundations and security of the international
community [and] violate the universal moral values and humanitarian
principles that lie hidden in the criminal law systems adopted by civi-
lized nations."8 9 The Geneva Convention created a duty to prosecute
80. J. G. STARKE, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAw 234 (10th ed. 1989) (asserting
that the reason for universal jurisdiction is to ensure that certain heinous crimes do not go
unpunished).
81. Paust, supra note 79, at 61.
82. Demjanjuk, 776 F.2d at 582 (6th Cir. 1985).
83. Bottini, supra note 73, at 515; see Regina v. Bartle (Ex Parte Pinochet), (1998) 37
I.L.M. 1302, 1303 (H. L.) ("[tihe fact even that an act is recogni[zled as a crime under
international law does not mean that the Courts of all States have jurisdiction to try it").
84. See Nuremberg Trials, supra note 36; Morgan, supra note 76, at 430.
85. Bottini, supra note 73, at 539.
86. Morgan, supra note 74, at 432 n.63.
87. See United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.
88. Morgan, supra note 74, at 433 n.73.
89. Attorney-Genn. of Isr. v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 277, 291 (Isr. S. Ct. 1962); see
Morgan, supra note 74, at 434 n.79.
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offenders who commit "grave breaches" 90 of the Geneva Convention. 91
Article 15 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
also recognized some form of universal jurisdiction.92 Additionally, ar-
ticles 5 and 7 of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment permitted universal
jurisdiction over nationals of state parties to the treaty.93 The U.S. is a
signatory to all three of the conventions above that recognize some
form of universal jurisdiction.94 The U.S. as a signatory to these con-
ventions and other countries has a duty to prosecute offenders of
international law; especially since a violation of international law is a
crime against humanity. A country which carries out its duty would
then have the benefit of an international court that may exercise uni-
versal jurisdiction. Precedent indicates there is an international duty
for nation states to prosecute violators of international law that grants
universal jurisdiction in the international community.
Many more countries are recognizing the application of univer-
sal jurisdiction.9 5 The U.S. has recognized universal jurisdiction in
civil cases by aliens, under the Alien Tort Criminal Act (ATCA), the
Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA), and in situations where the of-
fender was present in the U.S.96 During the Yugoslav and Rwandan
90. See Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, art. 49, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31, 62; Geneva
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked
Members of Armed Forces at Sea, art. 50, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85, 116; Geneva
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 129, Aug. 12, 1949, 75
U.N.T.S. 135, 236; Geneva Convention Relative to the Prosecution of Civilian Person in
Time of War, art. 146, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, 386 ("grave breaches" include willful
killing, torture or inhumane treatment, causing great suffering or serious injury to body or
health, and other serious violations of the laws of war).
91. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Prosecution of Civilian Person in Time of
War, art. 146, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, 386 (stating -persons alleged to have
committed, or to have ordered to be committed, such grave breaches" of the laws of war are
subject to the jurisdiction of all the state parties); Morgan, supra note 74, at 434.
92. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A, at art.
15, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) ("Nothing in this
article shall prejudice the trial and punishment of any person for any act or omission which,
at the time it was committed, was criminal according to the general principles of the law
recognized by the community of nations.").
93. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., 93rd plen. mtg., Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc. A/Res/39/46
(Dec. 10, 1984) (granting jurisdiction over crimes of torture or complicity in committing
torture) [hereinafter "Convention Against Torture"]
94. Id. (the United States is a signatory to the convention).
95. Morgan, supra note 74, at 437 nn.108-118.
96. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F. 2d 876, 878 (2nd Cir. 1980); see Eugene
Kontorovich, The Piracy Analogy: Modern Universal Jurisdiction's Hollow Foundation, 45
HARv. INT'L L. J. 183, 189 n.28 (2004); Morgan, supra note 76, at 435 nn.1-2, 89-93.
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civil wars, the Security Council established the ICTY and the ICTR to
investigate and prosecute international crimes including crimes
against humanity.9 7 The authority of universal jurisdiction was af-
firmed against the Chilean military dictator Augusto Pinochet when
Spain, France, Belgium and Switzerland initiated criminal investiga-
tions against him.9 8 Universal jurisdiction is gaining favor in the
international community. It may be time to recognize jurisdiction over
nations for citizens' claims against their nation state for its policy fail-
ures. Where would the international community get the authority to
exercise jurisdiction over nations?
A. International Court of Justice (ICJ) Foundation for Jurisdiction
It appears as though the U.N., through the ICJ, may be able to
exercise universal jurisdiction over any "[m]ember"99 state that threat-
ens "justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and
other sources of international law."100 Article 92 established that the
ICJ "shall be the principal judicial organ of the U.N.,"101 and "[a]ll
Members of the United Nations are ipso facto parties to the Statute of
the International Court of Justice. 102 Since the U.S. is a member of the
U.N., it follows that the ICJ may exercise universal jurisdiction over a
claim arising out of other sources of international law; for example,
customary international laws and other such treaties. Thus, there ap-
pears to be authority for the ICJ to exercise jurisdiction over a nation
in a civil claim brought by citizens.
V. MAKING THE CASE THAT THE SITUATION IN DARFUR
WAS A CRIME AGAINST HumAriTy
If ever any event justified a call to action to address a crime, it
would be the situation in Darfur. 103 The circumstances in Darfur are
not of nature, but of man and are offered to show that the government
97. Morgan, supra note 74, at 437 nn.103-107.
98. Morgan, supra note 74, at 440 (describing House of Lords affirmation that the
principle of universal jurisdiction would apply for criminal charges of torture committed
during the time Pinochet was in power).
99. U.N. Charter art. 3, para. 1 (explaining the United States participation in the
United Nations Conference on International Organization at San Francisco).
100. Id. at 1152.
101. Id. at 92.
102. Id. at 93.
103. DoSomething.Org, http://www.dosomething.org/node/12846 (last visited Oct. 22,
2008) [hereinafter DoSomething.Org] (providing background on the Darfur Genocide).
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policies caused results similar to those in a natural disaster. The
death and humiliation are the result of the government policies which
constitute a systematic and widespread attack on the African people of
Darfur.
In 2003 a major conflict began in Darfur after two rebel groups,
the Sudanese Liberation Army and Movement and the Justice and
Equality Movement, attacked government targets claiming the region
was being neglected by the government.104 Darfur has faced many
years of tension over land and grazing rights between the mostly no-
madic Arabs, and farmers from the Fur, Massaleet, and Zagawa
communities. 0 5 The rebels claimed that the government oppressed
the black Africans in favor of the Arabs and have waged attacks
against the state to show disapproval. 0 In response, the government
waged a systematic campaign of "ethnic cleansing" against the rebels,
and the civilian communities: Fur, Massaleet, and Zagawa. 0 7 The Su-
danese government and Janjaweed militias have burned and destroyed
hundreds of villages and raped and assaulted thousands of women and
girls, all while causing tens of thousands of civilian deaths and displac-
ing millions of people.' 08 The Sudanese government does not want
foreign countries to get involved in affairs in their country.xo0 The gov-
ernment of Sudan has carried out air strikes on civilian areas believed
to be under rebel control." 0 Sudan agreed in July 2007 to allow the
U.N. Security Council to deploy peacekeeping troops under certain con-
ditions."' In February 2008, Sudanese forces and allied militia
carried out a series of coordinated attacks on three villages in West
Darfur.112
The attacks by the Sudanese government are representative of
the types of crimes that international law was created to prevent. The
Sudanese government's systematic ethnic cleansing campaign result-
ing in the murder and displacement of millions of citizens in Darfur
surely represents an attack against all man-kind, and is the type of
offense that contradicts international preemptory norms, orjus cogens.








111. Id. (troops must be of African countries and government refused to provide land for
bases and critical equipment to arrive).
112. Id.
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The murder and persecution against the black Africans, an identifiable
group in the region, is a violation enumerated under Article 7 of the
Rome Statute, which has become the authoritative interpretation of
crimes against humanity in international law. The attack on the Afri-
cans of Fur, Massaleet, and Zagawa communities was part of a
systematic or widespread attack directed against a civilian population
through "ethnic cleansing," as shown by the burned and destroyed vil-
lages, civilian deaths, millions of displaced people and thousands of
raped and assaulted women and girls. Furthermore, the government
of Sudan does not want foreign countries to get involved in its affairs,
and has carried out air strikes against civilian populations in the re-
gion, demonstrating that the government has knowledge of the
attacks. Taken in this context, the acts by Sudan, which are system-
atic or widespread, even if they occurred only once, may be sufficient to
constitute a crime against humanity. Thus, the atrocities in Darfur
are crimes against humanity which require international intervention
to prevent the offenders from escaping impunity.
Another country would be justified in seeking justice for the Su-
danese government for its heinous acts. Any country would be justified
under its international obligation to prevent crimes against mankind
that cause this sort of suffering, indignity, inhumanity, and loss of life.
It would be appropriate for the international courts to exercise univer-
sal jurisdiction to punish Sudan for its violations of international law.
VI. MAKING THE CASE THAT THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
RESPONSE To HURRICANE KATRINA VICTIMS
WAS A CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY
In August 2005, the United States experienced Hurricane Ka-
trina, one of the worst catastrophic natural disasters in history."13 The
federal government response to the disaster was wholly inadequate. 114
113. LESSONs LEARNED, supra note 5, at 5; see also LAWRENCE J. VALE AND THOMAS J.
CAMPANELLA, THE RESILIENT CITY: How MODERN CITIES RECOVER FROM DISASTER
[hereinafter Resilient City] (New York: Oxford University Press 2005); U.S. Census Bureau,
"Table 10. Population of the 100 Largest Urban Places: 1870," June 15, 1998, http://www.
census.gov/population/documentation/twps0027/tablO.txt. (asserting that in 1871, Chicago
was the fifth largest city in the United States, with a population of almost 300,000. The fire
killed 300 people, made one-third of the city homeless, and destroyed a third of the city's
property. For Chicago Fire deaths and population displacement).
114. LESSONs LEARNED, supra note 5, at 1.
The awe that viewers held for the sheer ferocity of nature was soon matched with
disappointment and frustration at the seeming inability of the 'government'-local,
State, and [flederal-to respond effectively to the crisis. Hurricane Katrina and the
subsequent sustained flooding of New Orleans exposed significant flaws in [flederal,
State, and local preparedness for catastrophic events and our capacity to respond to
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President George W. Bush accepted responsibility for the ineffective
response time.115 Federal government plans created after September
11, 2001, failed to adequately account for widespread or simultaneous
catastrophes.1 1 6 "[O]ne of the lessons of this storm is the decency of
people, the decency of men and women who care a lot about their fellow
citizens."117 That it took such a tragic event to make the federal gov-
ernment recognize that it should care for its citizens reveals a sad state
of affairs. Katrina caused more property damage than any other natu-
ral disaster and was the deadliest since 1928.118 Thousands of people
were displaced.119 The painful images of people suffering and in de-
spair are forever seared into the minds of all Americans.120 The
federal government acknowledged a duty for protecting the citizens of
the U.S. after September 11, 2001, to "prepare for, respond to, and re-
cover from domestic incidents, regardless of cause, size, or
complexity."121 FEMA was a "multi-agency center that provided over-
all federal response coordination for Incidents of National Significance
them. Emergency plans at all levels of government, from small town plans to the
600-page National Response Plan-the [flederal government's plan to coordinate all
its departments and agencies and integrate them with State, local, and private
sector partners-were put to the ultimate test, and came up short. Id.
115. LESSONs LEARNED, supra note 5 ("[Flour years after the frightening experience of
September the 11th, Americans have every right to expect a more effective response in a
time of emergency. When the federal government fails to meet such an obligation, I, as
President, am responsible for the problem, and for the solution.").
116. LESSONs LEARNED, supra note 5.
117. Id. at 2.
118. Id. at 6-7 (estimating $96 billion in property damages, natural or man-made
disasters; 1,330 deaths).
119. Id. at 8 (finding 770,000 people displaced and housing options arrived slowly; by
October 2005, nearly 4,500 people were still living in shelters).
120. Id. at 9.
121. Id. at 12.
The President proposed that the initiative be led by the yet-to-be created
Department of Homeland Security (DHS). In creating DHS in November 2002,
Congress included the initiative as part of the Secretary of Homeland Security's
responsibilities. The Homeland Security Act was officially signed into law by the
President on November 25, 2002. On March 1, 2003, DHS assumed operational
control of the nearly 180,000 employees from portions of 22 departments, agencies,
and offices that were combined to constitute the newly created Department.
In February 2003, the President issued Homeland Security Presidential Directive
5 (HSPD-5). Homeland Security Presidential Directives are presidential orders that
establish national policies, priorities, and guidelines to strengthen U.S. homeland
security. In HSPD-5, the President specifically directed the Secretary of Homeland
Security to: (a) create a comprehensive National Incident Management System
(NIMS) to provide a consistent nationwide approach for [flederal, [s]tate, and local
governments to work effectively together to prepare for, respond to, and recover from
domestic incidents, regardless of cause, size, or complexity, and; (b) develop and
administer an integrated National Response Plan (NRP), using the NIMS, to provide
the structure and mechanisms for national level policy and operational direction for
[flederal support to State and local incident managers. Id.
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and emergency management program implementation." 122 The re-
gion's most vulnerable residents and those individuals with special
needs suffered terribly from inadequate or nonexistent evacuation op-
erations. 123 In addition, hundreds of hospital patients were stranded
inside dark and flooded facilities that lacked basic supplies. 124 Some
patients succumbed to the horrible conditions before they could be
evacuated. 125 At St. Rita's Nursing Home in St. Bernard Parish, Loui-
siana, thirty-four nursing home residents drowned in the floods. 126 On
the morning of August 30, the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS) assessed the Superdome as "uninhabitable."127 "By the
morning of September 2, approximately fifteen thousand people had
been evacuated from the Superdome, leaving approximately [five thou-
sand] five hundred remaining." 2 8 The government response has been
summarized as follows:
Hurricane Katrina necessitated a national response that [flederal,
[sitate, and local officials were unprepared to provide . . . The
[flederal response suffered from significant organization and coordi-
nation problems during this week of crisis. The lack of
communications and situational awareness had a debilitating effect
on the [flederal response. Even after coordinating elements were in
place, [flederal departments and agencies continued to have diffi-
culty adapting their standard procedures to this catastrophic
incident. The [flederal government's problems responding to Hurri-
cane Katrina illustrate greater systemic weaknesses inherent in
our current national preparedness system: the lack of expertise in
the areas of response, recovery, and reconstruction. Insufficient
planning, training, and interagency coordination are not problems
that began and ended with Hurricane Katrina. The storm demon-
strated the need for greater integration and synchronization of
preparedness efforts, not only throughout the [flederal government,
but also with the [s]tate and local governments and the private and
non-profit sectors as well.129
FEMA also had difficulty delivering food, water, and other critical com-
modities to people waiting to be evacuated, most significantly at the
Superdome.13 0 The experience the victims of Katrina had with the fed-
eral government vividly illustrates the devastation and misery that
122. LESSONs LEARNED, supra note 5, at 15.




127. Id. at 39.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 50.
130. Id. at 57 n.32.
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can occur when there is a lack of preparation coupled with a dismal
response to a natural disaster.131
According to Representative Tom Davis, Chairman of the U.S.
House of Representatives Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate
the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, "[Hurricane
Katrina was] a storm that was predicted with unprecedented timeli-
ness and accuracy."132 That committee had several findings:
1. The Secretary Department of Homeland Security should have
designated the Principal Federal Official on Saturday, two days
prior to landfall, from the roster of PFOs who had successfully
completed the required training, unlike then FEMA Director
Michael Brown. Considerable confusion was caused by the Secre-
tary's PFO decisions.
2. DHS and FEMA lacked adequate trained and experienced staff
for the Katrina response.
3. The readiness of FEMA's national emergency response teams
was inadequate and reduced the effectiveness of the federal
response.
Before Katrina, FEMA suffered from a lack of sufficiently
trained procurement professionals.' 33
Other failings were also noted. The Committee devoted an entire sec-
tion of the report to listing the actions of FE1IA. Their conclusion:
For years emergency management professionals have been warning
that FEMA's preparedness has eroded. Many believe this erosion is
a result of the separation of the preparedness function from FEMA,
the drain of long-term professional staff along with their institu-
tional knowledge and expertise, and the inadequate readiness of
FEMA's national emergency response teams. The combination of
these staffing, training, and organizational structures made
FEMA's inadequate performance in the face of a disaster the size of
Katrina all but inevitable.134
Pursuant to a temporary restraining order issued by Hon. Stanwood R.
Duval, United States District Court Judge, Eastern District of Louisi-
ana, and as a result of the McWaters v. FEMA class-action,13 5 February
7, 2006, was set as the official deadline for any further coverage of tem-
131. See Himberger, supra note 10, at 4.
132. Tom Davis, Chairman, Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation
For and Response to Hurricane Katrina, Sep. 22, 2005 available at http://katrina.house.gov/
hearings/09_22_05/davis open-state92205.doc (last visited Nov. 16, 2008) (opening
statement outlining the purpose of the committee).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. McWaters v. FEMA, 408 F.Supp. 2d 221 (E.D. La. 2006) (order establishing the
date for all claims to be filed).
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porary housing costs for Katrina victims. After the February 7
deadline, Katrina victims were left to their own devices to either find
permanent housing for the long term or to continue in social welfare
programs set up by other organizations.
A. Tsunami in South Asia
On the other side of the world the U.S. was able to respond to a
natural disaster that was on an even greater scale than Hurricane Ka-
trina.136 On December 26, 2004, a major earthquake followed by a
tsunami devastated the many Asian coastal areas.137 More than
200,000 people lost their lives, and at least 100,000 people are still
missing.'38 The brunt of the storm struck the coast of Indonesia and
Sri Lanka.139 USAID immediately mobilized staff to respond to the
humanitarian needs in the affected country.140 More than 150 USAID
personnel were on the ground conducting assessments of the area.141
The Department of Defense ("DOD") brought into action military as-
sets, providing nearly 16,000 military personnel, 26 ships, 58
helicopters, and 43 fixed wing aircraft.142 The DOD delivered over 10
million pounds of food and supplies, and over 400,000 gallons of fresh
water. 4 3 The pledge by the U.S. toward the relief and rebuilding for
this region of the world stands at $350 million, and President Bush
had requested an additional supplement of $701 million.144
During the international crisis in South Asia, the U.S. was able
to respond much faster to the needs of the Asian community on the
other side of the world than it was to Hurricane Katrina victims of
136. USAID, USAID Rebuilds Lives After the Tsunami, http://www.usaid.gov/locations/
asia near east/tsunami/ (last visited Nov. 9, 2008) (placing USAID personnel in the region
to provide emergency disaster relief to the victims of Indonesia and Sri Lanka a day after




140. The White House, US Support for Earthquake and Tsunami Victims, available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/tsunamil (last visited Nov. 28, 2008); see also U.S.
Embassy Press Release, United States Government Response to the Tsunami Disaster in
Indonesia, Jan. 2, 2005 http://jakartausembassy.gov/press-rel/USG-response.html (last
visited Nov. 9, 2008).
141. The White House, supra note 140.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Charles E. Hanrahan, Senior Specialist in Agricultural Policy Resources, Science
and Industry Division, Indian Ocean Earthquake and Tsunamis: Food Aid Needs and the




New Orleans, which occurred within its' own borders. Hundreds of
millions of dollars have been pledged by the federal government to-
ward the relief and rebuilding of the Asian coastal communities and
additional funding is still sought. Without a doubt, all Americans are
sympathetic to the tragedy suffered by the people of South Asia and in
New Orleans. However, the federal government should be held ac-
countable to the taxpayers to uphold its obligations to its citizens with
an equally aggressive commitment and pledge to relieve the suffering
of the victims and rebuild the city of New Orleans.
VII. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO HURRICANE
KATRINA AS A CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY
A crime against humanity is a crime under international cus-
tomary law. 145 For there to be a crime against humanity there must be
inhumane acts committed against a civilian population. During Hurri-
cane Andrew, the federal government policies failed to meet the
emergency needs of the residents of South Florida by not responding
fast enough to house, feed, and sustain the approximately 250,000 peo-
ple left homeless. The civilian victims of Hurricane Andrew suffered
inhumane acts as a result of policies instituted by the federal govern-
ment. There were lessons to be learned following that disaster, but the
implementation has shown to be unsuccessful. The same issue of not
responding fast enough to the people plagued the federal government
in South Carolina when Hurricane Hugo made landfall in 1989. With
Hurricane Katrina, the federal government had advance notice of the
threat and potential force and failed to adequately prepare and warn
the citizens located in the Gulf Coast causing the civilians there to suf-
fer inhumane acts, reflecting a pattern of failed policies in disaster
preparedness. These policies resulted in death and caused injury to
the physical and mental health of many of the Katrina victims. The
conditions in the Superdome and Convention Center were "uninhabit-
able."14 6 The government had placed upon itself, and rightfully so
after September 11th, the responsibility to ensure the safety of its citi-
zens in a natural or man-made disaster.
Generally a single act does not constitute a crime against hu-
manity; however, where there has been a "systematic and widespread"
145. See Nuremberg Trials, supra note 36.
146. The White House, supra note 140 (explaining the U.S. Department of Health
declared the Superdome and Convention Center uninhabitable following Hurricane
Katrina, because there was no fresh water, food, and hygiene facilities for the thousands of
people that were housed there).
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attack on the civilian people, a single act can qualify. 147 The federal
government's inadequate policies and failures in responding to natural
disasters like Hurricane Katrina, Andrew, and Hugo show a system-
atic and widespread attack on the civilians of these regions. There is a
pattern within the federal government that reveals a fundamental
problem in protecting its citizens from natural disasters. If the federal
government can coordinate a response to an unforeseen tsunami in
South Asia within a day and have personnel on the ground, it ought to
be able to respond just as quickly to the humanitarian needs of its
owns citizens. The lack of preparedness resulted in the death of hun-
dreds of people and the humiliation and degradation of displaced
people throughout the country. The failure of the federal government
to properly prepare and train personnel in response to a natural disas-
ter of this magnitude is a crime. Surely governmental responses to
natural disasters in emergency circumstances were not the type of
crimes the international community had in mind when developing the
concept of universal jurisdiction.
On the other hand, the situation in Darfur would probably fit
squarely into the type of conduct that is "universally condemned" by
the international community. The ICJ has jurisdiction over those acts
that are against customary international law, and crimes against hu-
manity have traditionally been against customary international law.
The Sudanese government has waged a systematic widespread "ethnic
cleansing" attack on its civilian communities. The Sudanese govern-
ment is murdering and exterminating its own citizens which is a crime
against humanity under international law. Air strikes carried out by
the Sudanese government against civilians are inhumane and cause
suffering and humiliation. Although the Sudanese government is
against international intervention, it is the duty, responsibility, and
obligation of the international community to prevent and remove
threats against international peace and security. The Sudanese gov-
ernment currently represents that threat toward international peace
and security. Customary international law prohibits acts by leaders
that are against the international community's preemptory norms and
values.
It is difficult to persuade anyone that the failures of the federal
government in a natural disaster should be a crime, let alone a crime
against humanity. However, just as in tort law, individuals have to
accept responsibility for their actions; if governments act negligently,
then private citizens should not be denied their day in court. Though
147. Doe, 348 F. Supp. 2d 1112, 1154-1157.
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the U.S. courts have recognized universal jurisdiction for international
tort claims and the crime of torture, it should recognize universal juris-
diction for other crimes that are prescribed in treaties and
international law. The U.S., as signatory to the U.N. Charter, has ac-
cepted that the ICJ may exercise universal jurisdiction for the acts
that threaten the peace and security of the world. One limitation on
the exercise of jurisdiction over a nation is sovereign immunity. Sover-
eign immunity is recognized as a legitimate justification for the leader
of a country to escape liability for his or her decisions while in office.
This note is not a proposal that the President of the United States
should face criminal charges for his decisions regarding Hurricane Ka-
trina as the leader of the free world. However, the federal government
should have to face civil liability for how it handled the situation in
New Orleans. The holding in Mc Waters v. FEMA is an indication of
how much responsibility the government wants to accept for its failed
policies. This would be a circumstance where the international courts
could exercise jurisdiction to remedy the wrong by a nation.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The U.S. is not a signatory to the Rome Statute therefore uni-
versal jurisdiction may not be exercised under this statute because it
does not incorporate the U.N. Charter, nor does the charter confer ju-
risdiction to the ICJ or ICC over crimes where the states are not a
signatory. Universal jurisdiction is recognized for certain interna-
tional crimes that have been customary in international law. For
instance, it has been found in the absence of a treaty pursuant to in-
ternational common law for the crimes of torture because of the nature
of the crime. In recent times, it has been recognized in the wake of
terrorists acts because these crimes are heinous and against interna-
tional law. Crimes against humanity are just as heinous and as
offensive to the international community that universal jurisdiction
should be readily available to the state that wants to bring a-would-be
offender to justice. The ICJ appears to have broad jurisdiction to pre-
vent and remove threats to the peace and security of the international
community. If the federal government policies on preparedness for
Hurricane Katrina were to rise to the level of a crime against humanity
that was so heinous as to constitute a crime against the international
community, universal jurisdiction would be appropriate under a nation
state's duty and responsibility to prevent impunity under international
law.
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Although this note recognizes that the international courts may
be able to exercise universal jurisdiction for crimes against humanity,
the remedy of imprisonment, may not be appropriate to address the
injury to a civilian population. This note does not discount that the
ICC exercises jurisdiction over individuals and not nations.
